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Abstract
This Note argues that a new uniform limtiation on aviation liability must be internationally
recognized to address the concerns raised by the Coccia decision. Part I of this Note will discuss
the history and purpose of the Warsaw Convention’s limit on liability and the Italian Constitution
Court’s rejection of this provision in Coccia. Part II will discuss the international legal ramification
of the Coccia decision. Part III will analyze the need to reform Article 22(1) to rationally relate
the limit on liability to the development of international air transportation. This Note concludes
that a new liability limit must be formulated to ensure the adequacy and certainty of damage
compensation.
WARSAW CONVENTION LIMITATION ON LIABILITY:
THE NEED FOR REFORM AFTER COCCIA v.
TURKISH AIRLINES
INTRODUCTION
Article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention,' as amended by
Article XI of the Hague Protocol2 ("the Convention"), sets a
uniform limitation on airlines' liability for the personal injury
and death of passengers. In Coccia v. Turkish Airlines, the Italian
Constitution Court has declared Article 22(1) unconstitutional
while upholding the remaining provisions of the Convention.3
Coccia has focused international attention on the need to up-
date Article 22(1) of the Convention to reflect the changing
economic structure of the airline industry.
This Note argues that a new uniform limitation on aviation
liability must be internationally recognized to address the con-
cerns raised by the Coccia decision. A uniform limit would
avoid forum shopping and the comparison of differing domes-
1. The Warsaw Convention is the informal title for Convention of the Unifica-
tion of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, openedfor signa-
ture Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 1I [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention]. The Convention was the result of two conferences, the first in Paris in
1925, and the second in Warsaw in 1929. Article 22(1) of the Convention reads:
In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for each
passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs. Where, in accord-
ance with the law -of the court to which the case is submitted, damages may
be awarded in the form of periodical payments, the equivalent capital value
of the said payments shall not exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by spe-
cial contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of
liability.
Warsaw Convention, 49 Stat. 3000, 3019, T.S. No. 876, at 990, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, 25.
2. Protocol Amending the 1929 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air, at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, Sept. 28,
1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 (1963) [hereinafter Hague Protocol]. The Hague Protocol
came into force on August 1, 1963.
Article XI(I) amended Article 22(1) as follows:
In the carriage of persons the liability of the carrier for each passenger is
limited to the sum of 250,000 francs. Where, in accordance with the law of
the court seised of the case, damages may be awarded in the form of period-
ical payments, the equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not
exceed two hundred and fifty thousand francs. Nevertheless, by special con-
tract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.
Id. at 381.
3. Coccia v. Turkish Airlines, 108 Foro It. 1 1586, 1591 (Corte Cost. 1985), re-
printed in 10 AIR L. 294, 297 (English tr. 1985).
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tic laws. The Convention limit must be raised to ensure both
the certainty and adequacy of compensation. Part I of this
Note will discuss the history and purpose of the Warsaw Con-
vention's limit on liability and the Italian Constitution Court's
rejection of this provision in Coccia. Part II will discuss the in-
ternational legal ramifications of the Coccia decision. Part III
will analyze the need to reform Article 22(1) to rationally relate
the limit on liability to the development of international air
transportation. This Note concludes that a new liability limit
must be formulated to ensure the adequacy and certainty of
damage compensation.
I. COCCIA AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION
LIMITATION ON LIABILITY
The liability limit as set by the Convention no longer
serves the function of providing a uniform standard of recov-
ery. Signatories of the Convention have established independ-
ent limits that destroy the efficacy of the system established by
the Convention drafters. The decision in Coccia is representa-
tive of an outdated system that no longer provides adequate
damage compensation to air travelers.
A. The History and Purpose of Article 22(1)
of the Warsaw Convention
In 1929, the drafters of the Warsaw Convention set a lia-
bility limit for death and injury resulting from aviation acci-
dents at 125,000 Poincare francs (US$16,000), to aid in the de-
velopment of the then-infant air transportation industry.4 The
limitation afforded carriers a more definite and equitable basis
on which to obtain insurance rates and thus resulted in the re-
duction of carrier operating expenses.5 This uniform body of
worldwide liability rules was intended to supersede the scores
of differing domestic laws and thereby set a uniform, reliable,
and consistent basis for recovery for injury or damage to per-
sons.6 This limit has since been revised to US$58,000 pursu-
4. See Report of United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull, [1934] U.S. AVIA-
TION REV. 240, 242.
5. Id.
6. See Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1090 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922
(1977).
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ant to the Hague Protocol.7
Today, however, aviation is a multibillion-dollar industry
with sufficient insurance coverage to render unnecessary the
protection intended by the drafters of the Convention.8 In-
deed, no more than a few major states continue to honor an
unmodified Convention liability limit.9 There is a trend among
signatory nations to raise the liability limit by legislative enact-
ment. Several countries have set monetary limits in excess of
the ceiling contained in Article 22(1).lo For instance, carriers
operating in the United States are subject to a liability limit of
US$75,000 pursuant to the 1966 Montreal Agreement."
Although such differentiation is allowed under the special con-
tract provisions of the Warsaw Convention, it renders Article
22(1) a nullity. The Convention is subverted when certain sig-
natories independently establish liability limits.' 2
7. Hague Protocol, supra note 2, 478 U.N.T.S. 371, 381.
8. See Note, Warsaw Convention Limitations on Air Carrier Liability: A Critical View, 17
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 577, 592 (1986).
9. Cohen, Montreal Protocol, 8 AIR L. 146, 167 (1983).
10. This principle of increased liability limits in excess of the Warsaw ceiling has
been followed by these carriers and countries, which offer or mandate limits equal to
or exceeding US$58,000: Air Afrique, Austrian Airlines, Sabena, Burma Airways,
Scandinavian Airlines System, TACA, Finnair, Air France, Air India, U.T.A. Luf-
thansa, Condor Flugdienst, Irish Government for all Irish Carriers, El Al, Japan Air-
lines, Alia Royal Jordanian Airlines, Middle East Airlines, Luxair, Malaysian Airlines,
K.L.M., Martinair, Transvia, Air New Zealand, Norwegian Government for all Norwe-
gian Airlines, Air Panama, Singapore International Airlines, South African Airways,
Iberia, Sweden for all domestic and international flights by Swedish Carriers, Swit-
zerland as a licensing condition, Thai International Airlines, and Tunis Air. Id. at
157.
11. The Montreal Agreement of 1966 increased the per passenger liability limi-
tation to US$75,000. It affects only the cases of international transportation that,
according to the contract of carriage, include a place in the United States as a point
of origin, a point of destination, or an agreed stopping place. This agreement is the
last widely accepted amendment of the Warsaw Convention. 31 Fed. Reg. 7302
(1966).
The Montreal Agreement is a private agreement signed by the airlines under the
auspices of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and the Civil Aero-
nautics Board (CAB). Id.
12. The special contract provision is under the authority of Article 22(1) of the
Warsaw Convention, which provides that "by special contract, the carrier and the
passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability." Warsaw Convention, supra note 1,
art. 22(1), 49 Stat. 3000, 3019, T.S. No. 876, at 990, 137 L.N.T.S. I1, 25.
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B. The Italian Constitution Court Response to Worldwide
Disaffection with the Article 22(1) Limit in
Coccia v. Turkish Airlines
In Coccia v. Turkish Airlines,'" the Italian Constitution Court
declared Article 22(1) unconstitutional.' 4 In Coccia, the plain-
tiffs' daughter was killed on a Turkish Airlines flight from Tur-
key to Italy. 15 Plaintiffs initiated legal proceedings before the
Tribunal of Rome, 6 claiming full compensation for dam-
ages.' 7 The Tribunal subsequently referred the matter of the
constitutionality of Article 22(1) to the Constitution Court,
which has jurisdiction over questions relating to the legitimacy
of formal laws.' 8
The Constitution Court held that the limit established by
Article 22(1) violated equal protection guaranteed under the
Italian Constitution and provided for inadequate levels of com-
pensation.' 9 The Court reasoned that air travelers are denied
the compensation available to the users of other equally dan-
gerous means of transport, such as sea and rail transport. ° In
13. 108 Foro It. 1 1586 (Corte Cost. 1985), reprinted in 10 AIR L. 294 (English tr.
1985).
14. Id. at 1591, reprinted in 10 AIR L. 294, 305.
15. Id. at 1586, reprinted in 10 AIR L. 294, 294.
16. The Constitution Court, operating since 1956, reviews the constitutionality
of laws. Del Duca, The Expanding Role of International and Comparative Law Studies-An
Overview of the Italian Legal System, 88 DICKINSON L. REV. 221, 233 (1983).
When a constitutional issue is raised by a party or a court in a civil, criminal,
or administrative proceeding, the referring court first determines that the
constitutional issue is relevant to the decisions of the case and is not mani-
festly unfounded. The issue is then referred directly to the Constitution
Court. The initial proceeding remains suspended until the Constitution
Court decides the constitutional issue.
Id.
17. 108 Foro. It. I at 1586, reprinted in 10 AIR L. 294, 294.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1591, reprinted in 10 AIR L. 294, 305. Article 3 of the Costituzione
provides:
All citizens are invested with equal social status and are equal before
the law, without distinction as to sex, race, language, religion, political opin-
ions, and personal or social conditions. It is the responsibility of the Re-
public to remove all obstacles of an economic and social nature which, by
limiting the freedom and equality of citizens prevent the full development of
the individual and the participation of all workers in the political, economic
and social organization of the country.
COST. art. 3, reprinted in E. PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 500 (3d ed. English
tr. 1985) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS].
20. 108 Foro It. I at 1587, reprinted in 10 AIR L. 294, 298.
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addition, the Court stated that the Article 22(1) limit violated
Article 2 of the Italian Constitution, because it contains an in-
adequate certainty of compensation, thereby impairing the in-
violable safeguard of the person.2 '
Thus, at present no effective liability limits in international
air transport apply to Italy; full compensation is very likely to
be awarded in future decisions. 2 However, it was not the
Constitution Court's intention to destroy completely the no-
tion of a limit on liability as promulgated by the drafters of the
Convention. 3 Currently, the Italian legislature is considering
a bill 24 that would implement limits in the international air
transport of passengers.2 5 The proposed bill provides a liabil-
ity limit at the level envisaged by the 1975 Protocol of Mon-
treal No. 4.26 The Protocol sets a liability limit of 100,000 Spe-
cial Drawing Rights ("SDRs"), a unit based on a basket of cur-
rencies.2 7 However, the Protocol was not ratified because
several countries deemed the international SDR limit of
100,000 too low. 28 Therefore, the bill's proposed limit has al-
21. Id. at 1588, reprinted in 10 AIR L. 294, 301. Article 2 of the Costituzione
provides: "The republic recognizes and guarantees the inviolable rights of man,
both as an individual and as a member of the social groups in which his personality
finds expression, and imposes the performance of unalterable duties of a political,
economic and social nature." COST. art. 2, reprinted in CONSTrrUTONS OF NATIONS,
supra note 19, at ,500, 501.
22. Note, The Italian Proposal to Reinstate Air Carriers' Limits of Liability, 11 AIR L.
123 (1986).
23. Id.
24. Bill on the Limitation of Liability in the International Carriage of Passengers
by Air [hereinafter Bill], reprinted in 11 AIR L. 95 (1986).
25. Id.
26. Additional Protocol No. 4 to Amend the 1929 Convention for Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, as amended in 1955 [herein-
after Montreal Protocol No. 4], Cmnd. 6483. This Protocol provides for a change
from the Poincare gold franc to Special Drawing Rights ("SDRs"), as established by
the IMF. It also allows for maximum recovery in case of personal injury per passen-
ger to 100,000 SDRs as provided in Article 2. Article 2 also provides for states not a
party to the IMF to establish a limit on liability based on their own monetary system
in which the monetary unit is defined as sixty-five and a half milligrams of gold of
minimal fineness 900. Thirty states must ratify this protocol for it to become effec-
tive, but only three have ratified to date. Id.
27. See infra note 69.
28. The Montreal Protocol failed ratification because even with the proposed
increase, the liability limitations were viewed as too low. See Kreindler, Montreal Proto.
cols Defeated, N.Y.LJ., Apr. 4, 1983, at 1, col. 1; see also Hollings, Defeat of the Montreal
Protocols: Victory for Airline Passengers, TRIAL, May 1983, at 20; Hollings, The lontreal
Protocols: .4 Threat to the American System of Jurisprudence, TRIAL, Sept. 1982, at 69.
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ready failed to gain international acceptance. The proposed
bill also complies with the directive of the Constitution Court
in Coccia, which states that compensation must be "adequate
and certain" when the "supreme asset of life" has been im-
paired.29 All air carriers must take out an insurance coverage
of up to 100,000 SDRs for each passenger.3 0
The proposed bill is evidence of the intent on the part of
the Italian legislature to restore functionality to the system cre-
ated by the Warsaw Convention. The Coccia decision has cast
doubt on the efficacy of Article 22(1) of the Convention. It
highlights the need for a solution that would implement an in-
ternationally acceptable liability limit and ensure the availabil-
ity of compensation. However, the manner in which the Italian
court unilaterally chose to obviate Article 22(1), while adher-
ing to the remaining provisions of the Convention, has dis-
rupted the equilibrium and harmonious relationship between
the different provisions of the Convention, thereby resulting in
such aberrations as forum shopping.3
II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF COCCIA
A. The Reasons Why Coccia Violates the Law of International
Treaties by Unilaterally Declaring Article 22(1)
Unconstitutional
Italy cannot remain a signatory to the Convention in de-
claring Article 22(1) unconstitutional while upholding the re-
maining provisions of the Convention.3 2 If Italy wishes to im-
pose a higher limit of liability, it must denounce the Conven-
tion under the authority of Article 39 therein.3  Italy is a
29. 108 Foro. It. I at 1587, reprinted in 10 AIR L. 294, 295.
30. Article 3 provides that all air carriers take out an insurance coverage of no
less than 100,000 SDRs for each passenger. See Bill art. 3, supra note 24, reprinted in I 1
AIR L. 95, 96.
31. Bill, supra note 24, reprinted in II AIR L. 95. The Convention was predicated
upon instituting a uniform liability limit. The Italian position of no liability limit
results in complex forum shopping possibilities.
32. Hague Protocol, supra note 2, 478 U.N.T.S. 371, 385.
33. Warsaw Convention art. 39, supra note 1, 49 Stat. 3000, 3022, T.I.A.S. No.
876, at 983, 994, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, 32, as amended by Hague Protocol art. XXIV, supra
note 2, 478 U.N.T.S. 371, 389. Article XXIV of the Hague Protocol states:
(1) Any Party to this Protocol may denounce the Protocol by notifica-
tion addressed to the Government of the People's Republic of Poland.
(2) Denunciation shall take effect six months after the date of receipt by the
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signatory to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 4
which requires that a signatory to a multilateral treaty must ad-
here to the amendment provisions contained within the re-
spective treaty;3 5 any amendment of the Convention must be
made under Article XXIV.3 6 Article 40 of the Vienna Conven-
tion states that all contracting states must be notified of any
proposal to amend a multilateral treaty. 7 Each Contracting
State then has the right to take part in any decision proposing
to modify the treaty and in the negotiation and conclusion of
such modification." In addition, Article 41 of the Vienna Con-
vention provides that two or more parties to a multilateral
treaty can act among themselves to amend that treaty. 9 How-
ever, by establishing procedures through which modifications
are made, the Warsaw Convention implicitly excludes unilat-
eral action by signatories.4 °
Italy could properly have denounced the entire Conven-
tion under the authority of Article 39 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion.41 Denunciation would allow the Italian legislature to set
any liability limit separate and independent from the Conven-
tion limit without violating the Vienna Convention on the in-
ternational law of treaties. Italy would no longer be a signa-
tory to the Convention.
Government of the People's Republic of Poland of the notification of de-
nunciation. (3) As between the Parties to this Protocol, denunciation by any
of them of the Convention in accordance with Article 39 thereof shall not be
construed in any way as a denunciation of the Convention as amended by
this Protocol.
Id, In order to denounce the Convention, Italy would have to denounce both the
Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol.
34. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/11, 27, 8 I.L.M. 679, 694 (1969) [hereinafter Vi-
enna Convention].
35. Id.
36. Hague Protocol, art. XXIV, supra note 33.
37. Vienna Convention art. 40, supra note 34, 8 I.L.M. 679, 694.
38. Id.
39. Vienna Convention art. 41, supra note 34, 8 I.L.M. 679, 695.
40. Hague Protocol, supra note 2, 478 U.N.T.S. 371, 385.
41. Hague Protocol, supra note 2, 478 U.N.T.S. 371, 389. Italy could have fol-
lowed the steps taken by the United States, which denounced the Convention on
November 15, 1965. CAB Order No. E-23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966). After
claiming that the liability limitation for personal injury was too low, the United States
withdrew the notice of denunciation in return for the airlines' signatures to the Mon-
treal Agreement, which raises the monetary limit to US$75,000. Id. at 7302. Denun-
ciation by a signatory such as Italy might facilitate an exchange between Italy and the
other contracting parties concerning a new uniform limit of liability.
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The United States Supreme Court has held that unilateral
abrogation of the Convention would not be allowed in United
States courts in Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp.42
Cited as international precedent,4 3 Franklin Mint is inconsistent
with the decision of the Italian Constitution Court that abro-
gates the provisions of the Warsaw Convention. Franklin Mint
reviewed the cargo limit on liability as expressed in Article
22(2) of the Warsaw Convention.4 4 In upholding the Conven-
tion, the Supreme Court declared that the cargo liability limit
remains enforceable in the United States.45 The Supreme
Court recognized that the lack of a liability limit would expose
international carriers to unlimited liability in U.S. courts.4 6
The fact that the current Italian court declared Article
22(1) of the Convention unconstitutional, while adhering to
the remaining provisions of the treaty, is unacceptable. Italy's
unilateral action must not be emulated on an international
scale in the future. This breach of the Vienna Convention on
the international law of treaties should not go unnoticed.
B. Forum Shopping After Coccia: Jurisdiction is Determinative of
Liability Limits
By eliminating the liability limitation, the Coccia decision
encourages forum shopping. The liberal venue provisions of
Article 28(1) of the Convention 47 allow a plaintiff to bring an
action in four alternative fora: (1) the domicile of the carrier;
(2) the carrier's principal place of business; (3) the carrier's
place of business through which the contract was made; or
(4) the place of destination.48 Since Coccia, if an Alitalia jet
were to crash anywhere in the world, plaintiffs would desire to
bring the action in Italy so as to maximize the chances of a
higher damage compensation than that in force under the
Convention.49 A forum shopping problem would also be cre-
42. 466 U.S. 243, 251-52 (1984).
43. Franklin Mint v. T.W.A., Inc., 2 LLOYD'S REP. 432 (1984).
44. 466 U.S. at 243.
45. Id. at 253.
46. Note, supra note 8, at 582.
47. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28(1), 49 Stat. 3000, 3020, T.I.A.S.
No. 876, at 983, 992, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, 27.
48. Id.
49. Stanford v. Kuwait Airways Corp., 648 F. Supp. 657, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(where Kuwait Airways Corporation did not meet any of the venue provisons to bring
1987]
140 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 11:132
ated if a foreign air carrier crashed in Italy, or if Italy were the
place in which the contract for air transport was made, since
plaintiffs would bring an action in the Italian courts to take ad-
vantage of the absence of limit on liability. 0 The Warsaw
Convention was designed to prevent this sort of comparison of
the varying domestic laws.5 ' The Coccia decision breeds forum
shopping, complex litigation, and an overcrowding of the Ital-
ian courts, thereby creating an administrative nightmare.
III. UPDATING THE WARSAW CONVENTION'S LIABILITY
LIMITATION PROVISIONS
Coccia is representative of the worldwide disaffection with
the liability limit provided in the Convention. The govern-
ments of the signatories must approve a new protocol that
would institute a new universal liability limit. In seeking to
avoid the more controversial aspects of the unratified Montreal
Protocol No. 4, an analysis should be made of whether the
SDR is the appropriate conversion factor. In addition, each
carrier should be required to carry an amount of insurance
coverage that mirrors the liability limit and thereby ensures ad-
equate compensation. A clarification of the Law of Treaties is
necessary to eliminate future unilateral modification of a multi-
lateral treaty.
suit in the United States as (i) KAC was domiciled in Kuwait since it was organized
and operated under the laws of Kuwait; (ii) KAC's principal place of business is in
Kuwait since KAC's corporate and operational headquarters are in Kuwait, a large
majority of its employees work in Kuwait, and all its aircraft are registered there;
(iii) the contract was made where the decedents' airline tickets were purchased and
issued; and (iv) the place of destination was Karachi, Pakistan). See also In re Air Crash
Disaster at Malaga, Spain, 577 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'dsub nom. Petrire v.
Spantex, S.A., 756 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1985).
50. For like situations in aviation law leading to forum shopping and misapplica-
tion of the Convention, see Smith v. Canadian Pacific Airways, 452 F.2d 798, 799 (2d
Cir, 1971); Recumar, Inc. v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 795, 797
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804, 809 n.9 (2d Cir.
1966). Forum shopping undermines the Convention, which was designed to provide
uniform recoveries for claimants. Forum shopping is discouraged on an interna-
tional scale not only in the United States but also in England, Scotland, and the other
Commonwealth jurisdictions. See Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Consulex Ltd., 3 W.L.R.
971, I Lloyd's Rep. I (H.L. 1986); see also Union Industrielle et Maritime v. Petrosul
Int'l Ltd., 26 B.L.R. 309 (Can. Fed. Ct. Trial Div. 1984).
51. Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1090 (2d Cir. 1977).
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A. Necessity for a Worldwide Liability Limit
Coccia raises the question whether the current liability limi-
tations of Article 22(1) are rationally related to the underlying
policy of aiding the development of international air transpor-
tation.52 A comparison of the airline industry of 1929 to that
of the present is instructive in analyzing this issue.
The Convention was drafted with the aim of protecting
the then-infant airline industry by not imposing absolute liabil-
ity. 53 At that time, a single catastrophic accident would have
bankrupted an air carrier because extensive aviation insurance
was not yet available.54 Thus, the drafters' aim was to reduce
the operating expenses of the carrier by passing protective leg-
islation.5 5 This protection did not extend, however, "to
grossly negligent misconduct," in which case the carriers were
subject to no limit on liability.56 Today, in contrast, assets of
52. Dolan, Warsaw Convention Liability Limitations: Constitutional Issues, 6 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 896, 903 (1984).
53. Sir Alfred Dennis of Great Britain, one of the drafters of the Convention,
stated:
What can one demand of the air carrier? A normal organization of his oper-
ation, a judicious choice of his personnel, a constant surveillance of his
agents and servants, a rigorous control of his aircraft, spare parts and raw
material.
One must indeed admit that those who use aircraft are not ignorant of
the risks inherent in a mode of transportation which has not yet attained the
point of perfection that one hundred years has given to railroads.
It is therefore just not to impose absolute liability upon the carrier, but
to relieve him of all liability when he has taken reasonable and normal meas-
ures to avoid damage.
R. HORNER & D. LEGREZ, SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAU-
TICAL LAW MINUTES, WARSAW, 1929, at 31,49 (1975) (Third Session, Oct. 6th Morn-
ing).
54. Note, supra note 8, at 591.
55. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80
HARV. L. REV. 497, 499-500 (1967).
56. Penalties for grossly negligent misconduct are provided for in Article XIII of
the Hague Protocol, which states:
The limits of liability specified in Article 22 shall not apply if it is proved that
the damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, his servants or
agents, done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge
that damage would probably result; provided that, in the case of such act or
omission of a servant or agent, it is also proved that he was acting within the
scope of his employment.
Hague Protocol art. XIII, supra note 2, 478 U.N.T.S. 371, 383; see Price, Goldman v.
Thai Airways Int'l Limited: Article 25 the lWarsaw Convention Meaning of Recklessly, 8 AIR
L. 171 (1983).
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the larger airlines are measured in billions of dollars apiece
and full insurance coverage is available.
Currently a number of signatory nations are establishing
higher thresholds of recovery under the special contract provi-
sions of the Convention.5 8 There is a plethora of mandated
limits and "voluntary" limits. 5 9 It is becoming difficult to find
more than a few major states where an unmodified Warsaw
Convention limitation is still in effect.60 As one commentator
has suggested, "[i]f this is the real world in the 1980's then let
the treaty so reflect it."''n In contrast, some commentators ar-
gue that the liability limits should be totally discarded.62 Spe-
cifically, each nation or state should be free to establish
whatever minimum liability requirements are deemed suitable
for its citizens.6 3 This national minimum liability requirement
would apply on all air traffic from or to the particular state.'
The Warsaw Convention would not have to specify the limits
of liability but only state that the limits established by a party
to the Convention would apply.6 5 Continued international co-
operation in all other provisions of the Convention could thus
continue.
However, a uniform liability limit is essential to set a relia-
ble and consistent basis for recovery. If the desire for uniform-
ity is indeed the mortar that ensures the efficacy of the Warsaw
Convention, all of the contracting parties to the Convention
should agree on a new worldwide liability limit. This limit
should supersede existing or future national supplemental
compensation plans or agreements such as the 1966 Montreal
57. Note, supra note 8, at 592.
58. Hague Protocol, supra note 2, 478 U.N.T.S. 371, 381.
59. Cohen, supra note 9, at 146, 167 (1983).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Studies by the International Chamber of Commerce, by an Air Law Working
Group under Professor K-H Bockstiegel (which has called for the immediate ratifica-
tion of Montreal Additional Protocol No. 4 1975, 36 R.F.D.A. 364 (1982), cited in C.
SHAwcRoss & M. BEAUMONT, AIR LAw, VII 41; see International Law Association Re-
port of 59th Committee Under Professor Bin Cheng Which Advocate the Compensa-
tion of Personal Injuries Through a System of Unlimited and Absolute Liability, cited
in C. SHAWCROSS & M. BEAUMONT, AIR LAw, VII 41; see also DeVivo, The Warsaw
Convention: Judicial Tolling of the Death Knell?, 49J. AIR L. & COM. 71 (1983).
63. DeVivo, supra note 62, at 71.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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Agreement. 66 It would provide uniform recoveries for claim-
ants and foreseeable, insurable liabilities for airlines. In this
scheme, the possibility of forum shopping would be effectively
extinguished.
Proposals for setting a new uniform liability limit should
follow the general guidelines first set forth in the Montreal
Protocol No. 4,67 which was never ratified by a required thirty
signatories. 68 The Protocols express all liability limitations in
terms of the SDR, a unit based on an international basket of
currencies.69 Under the Montreal Protocol No. 4, the limitation
on liability for personal injury or death would have increased
from 75,000 to 100,000 SDRs. 70 Neither of the Protocols has
been ratified by a required majority of the parties to the Con-
vention because (1) the liability limitations are unbreakable
even in cases of willful misconduct, which gives rise to unlim-
ited recovery under Article 25(1) of the Convention;7t and
(2) the liability limitations are viewed as inadequate.72 To gain
international acceptance, a subsequent protocol should elimi-
nate provisions that undermine Article 25(1) of the Conven-
tion and increase the liability limit.
B. The SDR as an Appropriate Conversion Factor
The drafters of the Convention expressed the liability
limit in terms of the gold franc." Today, SDRs have replaced
66. Montreal Agreement, supra note 11, at 425.
67. Montreal Protocol No. 4, supra note 26, at 75.
68. See supra note 28.
69. The five currencies are: the Japanese yen, the U.S. dollar, the British pound,
the West German mark, and the current, as opposed to the Poincare, French franc. R.
EDWARDS, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION 167, 179 (1985).
70. Montreal Protocol No. 4, supra note 26.
71. Dolan, supra note 52, at 898 n.14. Montreal Protocol No. 4 would have
made the liability limit unbreakable even in the case of willful misconduct, thereby
abolishing Article 25(1) of the Convention. Such a provision should be avoided in a
subsequent protocol in order to aid in acheiving universal consensus.
72. Id.
73. In order to ensure that the limits of liability under the Convention would
remain uniform and stable, the drafters of the Convention expressed the limitation in
terms of the French Poincare gold franc, which was defined as consisting of 65-1/2
milligrams of gold of millesimal fineness 900. See Asser, Golden Limitations of Liability
in International Transport Conventions and the Currency Crisis, 5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 645,
645 (1974). The use of a gold franc clause as a medium of conversion is readily
understandable when it is considered in light of the international gold exchange sys-
tem in existence when the Convention was drafted. When the Warsaw Convention
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gold as the international monetary function. 4 The SDR is a
stable international unit of account, is valued on the basis of a
basket of five national currencies, and does not have a compet-
ing use as a commodity. 5 SDRs are thus insulated from free-
market speculation and other difficulties that have led to insta-
bility in the price of gold and to gold's ultimate breakdown as
an international unit of account.7 6 Employed as a medium of
exchange between governments, central banks, and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund 77 ("IMF"), SDRs "serve as the comer-
stone of the new international system of finance. ' 78 Basing the
Warsaw limitation on the market price of gold has led to a
widely fluctuating limit on liability that varies substantially
from week to week or even day to day.79 Using SDRs would
fully comply with the intent of the framers of Article 22 since
was adopted, currencies were either expressed or easily convertible to gold using an
official rate.
In 1968, most states instituted procedures that set the stable official price of gold
side by side with a continuously fluctuating commodity price for gold. The market
price of gold did not differ significantly from the official rate of US$35 per ounce
until 1970, when the situation began to change radically because of the instability in
the commodity price. In late 1973, when the official price of gold in the United
States was fixed at $42.22 an ounce, the commodity price rose to $200 an ounce. In
order to relieve the severe economic pressures resulting from the instability in the
price of gold, the International Monetary Fund formulated the Jamaica Accords to
replace the official function of gold with Special Drawing Rights. See Silard, Carriage
of the SDR by Sea: The Unit of Account of the Hamburg Rules, 10J. MAR. L. & CoM. 13
(1978); see also The Warsaw Convention and the Two-Tiered Gold Market, 17 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 129 (1973).
74. SDRs are insulated from free-market speculation and other difficulties that
led to instability in the price of gold and to the ultimate breakdown of gold as an
international unit of account. Employed as a medium of exchange between govern-
ments, central banks, and the IMF, SDRs have replaced gold's international monetary
function. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMics 612 (11 th ed. 1980); see also Gold, Gold in
International Monetary Law: Change, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity, 15 J. Irr'L L. & ECON.
323, 354 (1981). As a result, "the SDR has first claim to recognition as the unit of
account to replace gold in universal international organizations." Gold, SDRs, Cur-
rencies and Gold, IMF PAMPHLET SERIES No. 33, at 96 (1980) [hereinafter IMF PAM-
PHLET].
75. IMF PAMPHLET, supra note 74, at 5-6.
76. Id.
77. The IMF is affiliated with the United Nations. It was organized at the Bret-
ton Woods Conference in 1944 to promote international monetary cooperation, to
facilitate the growth of international trade, and to assist in the establishment of a
multilateral system of payments for currency transactions among member states. R.
EDWARDS, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION, 4, Ii (1985).
78. IMF PAMPHLET, supra note 74.
79. Asser, supra note 73, at 646.
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they would result in a stable and predictable limitation of lia-
bility.80
The current problem with the SDR is that some countries
have adopted the SDR and others have not.8 ' Thus, non-SDR
countries adjust their currencies to the SDR as they see fit.82
This unilateral decision to adjust to the SDR is subject to any
change in the law of the state regarding the conversion of
monetary units into its national currency.83 Hence, despite its
relative stability, the SDR has not fostered the kind of uniform
adoption and application that is necessary.
The initiative to arrive at a universal liability limit rests
with the governments of the signatories and particularly with
the United States, which has still ratified only the original 1929
text of the Warsaw Convention.84 The failure of the United
States to ratify Montreal Protocol No. 4 has thrown the War-
saw system into a shambles.85 The Senate should decide on an
acceptable liability limit and present the other signatories with
a new protocol for universal ratification.86  The limit of
100,000 SDRs, as stated in Montreal Protocol No. 4, needs to
be raised in this effort, as it has already been criticized as inad-
equate.87
80. A Warsaw limit using SDRs as the unit of account is intended to be as faith-
ful a translation as possible of Poincare francs at the "old" official price for gold.
McGilchrist, Four New Protocols to the Warsaw Convention, 1976 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM.
L.Q. 186, 187.
81. DeVivo, supra note 62, at 115.
82. One commentator has.stated:
Such states may at the time of ratification or acession to a Protocol declare
that the limit of liability of the carrier in judicial proceedings in their territo-
ries is fixed at a certain quantity of 'monetary units' which are defined in
exactly the same way as were the Poincare francs previously, that is sixty-five
and one-half milligrammes of gold of millesimal fineness nine hundred.
Id.
83. Id.
84. The Supreme Court chose the gold standard as the valuation standard in the
Franklin Mint decision. Note, supra note 8, at 586 n.61. The Court felt that to aban-
don gold for an artificial standard such as the SDR would be to rewrite the treaty.
Therefore, the courts need to be persuaded to alter this viewpoint and accept the
internationally recognized monetary standard, the SDR.
85. See 1 C. SHAWCROSS & M. BEAUMONT, AIR LAw, VII 36 - VII 38 (1985).
86. Id. at VII 41 -VII 42. The Senate rejected Montreal Protocol No. 4 on March
8, 1983. See 129 CONG. REC. S2279 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983).
87. Kreindler, supra note 28, at 1, col. 1.
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C. Relevant Insurance Considerations
The Convention should also be amended to require more
extensive insurance coverage per passenger. Such coverage
should equal the extent of liability, to ensure certainty and
guarantee adequate compensation. Such reform is advocated
by the bill proposed by the Italian legislature"8 and the Mon-
treal Protocol No. 4.'9 However, it has not been well re-
ceived. 0 While this is a stringent provision, it is well within
the intent of the drafters of the Convention since it guarantees
the certainty of compensation. The recent string of near colli-
sions among aircraft9 l highlights the necessity of providing ad-
equate coverage. It seems unlikely that if two jumbo jet airlin-
ers were to collide, carriers would have enough insurance to
meet the per passenger liability limit.
D. A Clarification of the Law of International Treaties
Lastly, a subsequent protocol should explicitly state that
any signatory's unilateral action to modify any provision of the
Convention is a violation of the law of multilateral treaties as
expressed in the Vienna Convention.9 2 Such action would dis-
courage forum shopping and avoid the general confusion that
has ensued following Coccia. A new clause should be added to
the Convention that provides that unilateral modification
would result in the signatory's automatic dismissal without a
hearing. Thus, violating parties would no longer be able to
change a certain provision while continuing to benefit from the
remaining provisions.
CONCLUSION
Coccia has far-reaching international implications. This
case highlights the need to update Article 22(1) of the Conven-
tion to reflect the current economic status of the airline indus-
try. On the other hand, it is a breach of international protocol
88. Bill, supra note 24, reprinted in 1 AIR L. 95, 95-96.
89. Montreal Protocol No. 4, supra note 26, at 75.
90. Kreindler, supra note 28, at 1.
91. See Stiff Rules Asked in the Navigating of Ocean Flights: Upgraded Procedure Sought
Because Two Jets Nearly Collided Over Atlantic, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1987, at Al, col.l;
Open Questions - Time for Debate (Midair Collision Over Los Angeles), L.A. DailyJ., Sept. 8,
1986, at 4, col. 1.
92. Vienna Convention, supra note 34, 8 I.L.M. 679, 694.
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to modify a treaty unilaterally. Coccia has disturbed the delicate
balance in civil aviation liability by giving rise to complex fo-
rum shopping possibilities. To preserve a uniform body of
worldwide liability rules to govern international aviation, a new
limit must be formulated and the SDR should be used as the
value. In addition, to ensure certainty and adequacy in dam-
age compensation, carriers should be required to obtain an
equivalent requirement of insurance. Such reform measures
will rationally relate the limit on liability to the development of
international air transportation.
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